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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Postal market liberalization is a current issue in Switzerland as well as in the 
European Union. The reserved area has been the traditional means to finance the 
provision  of  universal  postal  services  at  uniform  prices.  There  is,  therefore,  a 
concern that further reductions in the reserved area could undermine the ability of 
the incumbent postal operator to finance its universal service obligation (USO). 
Hence, the traditional USO has come under scrutiny in many countries. The two 
most important cost factors in the postal sector related to the USO are ubiquity of 
delivery at a uniform price and a network of post offices that is sufficient to enable 
accessibility to postal services for all citizens. 
In our paper, we discuss the role of the post office in the marketplace. It not 
only adds to the incumbent‟s cost, but also serves as its important and traditionally 
established hallmark. Hence, the optimization of the postal outlet network is of 
significant  strategic  and  political  importance.  While  some  post  offices  may  be 
converted  into  agencies,  franchises  and  specialized  counters  for  business 
customers, households beyond the reach of a postal outlet may also be served with 
postal products by the postman during his mail delivery tour. 
After  an  assessment  of  post  office  reorganization  programs  in  selected 
countries in Section 2, we focus in Section 3 on Swiss Post‟s optimization program 
in recent years that aimed at aligning its postal network to emerging competition 
and changing consumer needs. Whereas a significant fraction of post offices have 
been closed, the remaining ones now offer a far broader range of products. Further, 
besides new business customer solutions in collection, a number of specialized 
outlets for advanced financial services have been created. These measures have 
seen political and regulatory counteractions which resulted in heavier regulations. 
In  our  assessment  we  briefly  present  the  effects  on  Swiss  Post‟s  customer 
satisfaction and channel costs. To identify the impact of post office closures on 
overall mail volumes, we use time-series techniques with quarterly data between 
1980 and 2006. We find – in contrast to variables that capture the effect of the 
Internet – no significant effect of post office closures on overall mail volumes. 
                                                       
* The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of 
the institutions with which they are affiliated. In Section 4 we identify key strategic issues of post office realignments. We 
conclude in Section 5 that diversifying into financial services helps to sustain a 
comparably larger post office network. If no such option is available, agencies run 
by third parties seem to be the only long-term solution under competition. In either 
case, economies of scope play a vital role for sustaining self-financed access points 
for postal services.  
 
 
2.  REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND RECENT 
RESTRUCTURINGS IN REFERENCE COUNTRIES 
 
2.1  Literature Review 
In the recent stages of the liberalization process, the idea of universal service 
has become increasingly contested since the abolishment of partial monopolies 
severely  questions  its  financing.  Crew  and  Kleindorfer  (2007)  model  the 
interaction of maintaining the USO and opening postal markets. They argue that a 
broad USO (with e.g. severe restrictions on post office restructuring) implies large 
mark-ups to pay for the USO. Hence, restructuring may not only serve as a cost- 
cutting but also as a price-cutting instrument. 
The current debate is about the appropriate extent of the USO and the most 
efficient way to provide it, thereby making it as compatible with competition as 
possible.  Cremer  et  al.  (2007)  assess  alternative  economic  justifications  of  the 
USO.  A  USO  may  be  used  as  a  remedy  for  network  externalities,  and  as  a 
redistributive pricing policy.  It has some aspects of a public good and serves as an 
instrument of regional policy. They argue that the largest benefits of a USO are 
related to the role of postal products as inputs and thus to business mail. Replacing 
it by other means of regional policy or redistributive channels is not an option. In 
that sense, it is important that postal services are universally provided at a reliably 
high quality. However, it does not imply that these services have to be supplied 
through the traditional channels on the traditional postal network. 
The  focus  of  our  analysis  is  an  exploration  into  whether  and  how  a  high 
service level can be maintained notwithstanding deep restructuring of the physical 
network.  It  is inspired  by  the  work  by  Boldron et al. (2007)  who  analyze  the 
accessibility of the postal network compared to other industries in France. They 
find that “...the presence of commercial [postal] services combined with public 
[postal]  services  creates  demand  for  postal  services...”  (p.15).  Moreover,  they 
argue  that  the  high  territory  presence  of  postal  counters  creates  a  positive 
externality on their immediate environment and therefore contributes to economic 
development. However, currently, the net cost of the high postal accessibility is 
borne by the Universal Service Provider through a statutory monopoly on letters. 
The introduction of competition introduces the need for alternative funding or deep 
restructuring of the network – without damaging its social value, if possible. 
Cohen et al. (2008) illustrate that many (historical) post office networks lack 
the  alignment  to  competitive  needs.  The  authors  show  that  both  Italy  and  the 
United States have a disproportionate percentage of their post offices located in 
rural areas as compared with banks (IT) or pharmacies (US) and argue that the 
distribution of post offices has a similar pattern in most postal administrations. 
Further, they state that “in order to have competitive prices, incumbents will have to allocate costs based on causation, and bulk mail will pay only for the small 
portion of the retail network cost that it imposes”. They conclude that under a 
competitive scenario, there will be “considerable pressure to move toward a more 
commercial distribution of retail services, outsourcing, or both” because of the 
otherwise heavy financing burden of single-piece mail. 
Our discussion embraces international experiences in post office restructuring, 
but focuses on the Swiss market.  Thereby, it adds to previous analyses of the 
Swiss postal market, e.g. in Dietl et al. (2005) and Jaag (2007). 
 
2.2  Developments in (partly) liberalized markets 
Recent restructuring experience of postal networks varies. They are driven by 
regulatory constraints as well as by the chosen business models. We briefly present 
stylized cases from New Zealand, Sweden, France, Italy, Germany, and the UK.  
New Zealand Post (NZ Post) started to restructure its retail network in 1988, 
one year ahead of a first liberalization step in 1989. It started with more than 1200 
self-operated post offices. Three years before full market opening in 1998, about 
85%  of  the  post  offices  had  been  shut  down  and  the  first  experiences  with 
franchised  post  offices  were  successfully  completed.  Nowadays,  New  Zealand 
Post‟s retail network has grown again and consists of two different kinds of access 
points that exploit two different kinds of economies of scope. First, postal services 
as well as banking services are provided in 142 post offices operated by NZ Post 
and 181 franchised agencies. Thereby, economies of scope are exploited between 
postal services and Kiwibank, a subsidiary from NZ Post that was founded in 
2002. Second, 672 additional sales points are available, where third parties sell 
selected  postal  services  besides  their  core  business  (“shop  in  shop”).  Again, 
economies  of  scope  are  exploited  –  here  between  postal  services  and  other 
products such as groceries. Hence, traditional post offices that supply just postal 
services seem not to be an option for NZ Post. Kiwibank appears to be a story of 
success with more than 550‟000 customers as of September 2007 and strong yearly 
growth in deposits (64%), lending (39%), and mortgages.  Newly, mobile banking, 
insurance  products,  personal  loans,  and  foreign  currency  services  have  been 
launched. Kiwibank also considerably contributed to the financial performance of 
NZ Post, which improved its value added from NZ$ 2.7 Million in 2002 steadily 
up to NZ$ 28.1 Million in 2007. Importantly, Kiwibank increases New Zealand 
Post Group‟s EBITDA margin, i.e. Kiwibank's EBITDA margin lies well over 
13.1%.
2 
The realignment of  Sweden‟s Posten AB exhibits similar patterns but also 
important differences. In Sweden, the market was completely liberalized in 1993. 
Similar  as  NZ  Post,  Posten  AB  quickly  reduced  its  original  network  of 
approximately  4000  self-run  full-range  post  offices.  Additionally,  it  started 
franchising some of the remaining ones. However, in contrast to New Zealand 
Post, Posten AB did in 2002 not opt for starting a bank but chose to completely 
shut down its traditional post office network and to separate its postal services 
from financial transactions. For postal services, business centers were established 
for business customers whereas for small customers “shop in shop” solutions were 
on  the  agenda.  At  the  same  time  a  new  network  for  financial  services  called 
                                                       
2 New Zealand Post, Group Annual Report 2007 “Swensk Kassaservice” built. The latter remains in a serious financial  position 
despite subsequent branch closures, the opening for other financial suppliers, and 
government subsidies of SEK 300 Million (about 40% of net sales!). In 2007, 
Sweden Post submitted a closure schedule for its Cashier Service which suffered 
from steadily declining transaction volumes of about 20% per year.
3 Subsequently, 
Posten AB decided to shut down Swensk Kassaservice entirely. 
 
Figure 1: Different Approaches by New Zealand Post and Posten AB 
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In 2004, La Poste, the national postal operator of France, planned to overhaul 
its post office branch network by slating 6‟000 of its 17‟000 offices for closure. 
Furthermore, La Poste intended to convert some of the remaining offices into „sub 
post  offices‟  run  by  grocery  stores  or  located  in  town  halls.  Hence,  La  Poste 
intended to move into a similar direction as New Zealand Post. These ideas faced 
stiff resistance from both labor unions and local elected officials. Under heavy 
political pressure, La Poste was forced to put forward an alternative reorganization 
plan. Thereby, La Poste changed its strategy and is now adding additional services 
to their offices in order to increase revenues. This strategy was made easier by the 
decision  of  the  French  government  to  allow  La  Poste  to  expand  its  financial 
services by launching a bank. These initiatives are supported with the development 
of new post office concepts that aim at combining the different business lines like 
banking, letters and parcel and retail in a modern environment. 
Poste Italiane follows a similar path to the French post. Instead of trying to 
restructure the office network by closing down or outsourcing post offices, the 
Italian  Post  focused  from  the  beginning  of  its  overhaul  process  on  financial 
services. Starting in 2002, the Italian post used its 14‟000 outlets to add bank 
accounts and loans to its product range. This strategy proved to be very successful 
turning  around  the  national  incumbent  into  a  profit  making  company.  Poste 
Italiane could be even more profitable when provided with a banking license. So 
far, the company still has to remarket loans from other banks.   
The transformation of Deutsche Post’s post office network followed two main 
directions that exhibit patterns similar to the ones from New Zealand Post. On the 
one hand, small and medium sized post offices were transformed into agencies; on 
the other hand, larger offices were developed into bank branches. Like in many 
other European postal organizations, the agency concept is used to replace existing 
                                                       
3 Posten AB, Interim Report 2007 
Kiwi bank 
branches 
Independent, subsidized branches for 
financial transactions post  offices.  With  the  agency  concept,  postal  services  are  provided  at  retail 
locations of existing businesses. Deutsche Post has two different types of agencies 
in place. Either a partner (e.g. a grocery store) combines the postal services with its 
own business or Deutsche Post provides the services with its own personnel at a 
partner  location.  The  second  type  of  agency  is  required  in  order  to  fulfill  the 
regulatory obligation of maintaining 5‟000 self-run branches. In 2005, Deutsche 
Post sold 850 of its biggest branches to its subsidiary Postbank. With this move, 
Postbank aims at strengthening its position in the retail financial services market. 
These branches are gradually transformed into bank branches by adding consulting 
capacities and financial services know-how. The strategy of Deutsche Post and its 
subsidiary Postbank is obviously to either generate higher profits by selling more 
high margin products (financial services) or to cut cost by outsourcing the services 
to third parties (agencies). 
The  case  of  Royal  Mail,  UK‟s  incumbent  postal  organization,  shows  that 
maintaining a post office network that provides postal services without the help of 
high margin financial services leads to considerable problems. Between 2001 and 
2005, Royal Mail closed over 3‟000 post offices, close to 20% of its network. For 
a long time, Royal Mail post offices acted as a provider of benefit and pension 
payments  besides  the  classic  letter  and  parcel  business.  The  transfer  of  these 
payments to direct payments into bank accounts and the full market opening for 
letters and parcels at the beginning of 2006 left Royal Mail and its subsidiary Post 
Office Ltd. with an increasingly unprofitable network. Although Royal Mail added 
additional services to its product line, this seemed not to be sufficient to maintain a 
post office network of this size and scope as a viable business. Royal Mail has 
recently put in place a new initiative which will involve a closure of up to 2‟500 
branches.  Partially,  these  will  be  replaced  by  mobile  post  offices,  hosted  and 
partner services, and home delivery services. Despite these efforts Royal Mail still 
draws on government subsidies of currently £ 150 Million in order to keep its post 
office  network  in  place.  Meanwhile,  an  additional  £  1.7  Billion  government 
reorganization is on the table.  
Table 1 provides further background for the country studies discussed above as 
well as for Switzerland which we discuss in detail in Section 3.   
 
Table 1: Post office networks in selected countries as of 2006 










































































































































































































































































France  Monopoly 
50 Grams* 
No formal requirements. 
Accessibility must, however, be in 
line with the needs of local 
population, taking account of 
demographic, economic and social 
changes. 





17000  4800  17000  1700
0 




No  Yes / 
Yes 




Open*  Not less than 95% of users within 
5km of an access point capable of 
receiving the largest relevant postal 
packets and registered mail, and that 
the premises of not less than 95% of 
users in each postcode area are within 
10km of such access points. 










Germany  Open*  Since 1.1.2008 no formal 
requirements 
Yes  Yes / 
Yes 
No  12600  7000  12600  6500 
Sweden  Open  Accessible to everyone at a 
reasonable distance from one‟s home 
or workplace. The density of the 
access points must take into account 
the needs of users. 
Legal mandate to provide nationwide 
financial transaction services. 





2000  1630  2000  0 
New Zealand  Open  Minimum 880 postal shops and 
centres (at least 240 postal outlets to 
be full service outlets). 
Yes  Yes / 
Yes 
No  990  850  990  320 
Switzerland  Monopoly 
100 Grams 
90% of population in 20 Minutes by 
foot/public transport 
No  Yes / 
Yes 
No  2469  150  2469  2300 
* VAT exemption for USO-Provider/historical operator 
 
 
3.  THE SWISS CASE: RECENT RESTRUCTURINGS AND 
VOLUME EFFECTS 
 
3.1  Main developments and policy responses over the past decade  
At the beginning of 1998, PTT, Switzerland‟s postal and telecommunication 
organization  was  divided  into  two  separate  state  owned  companies.  The 
telecommunication part became Swisscom while the postal and financial services 
part was transformed into Swiss Post.  
Between 1998 and 2001 Swiss Post made several attempts to restructure and 
optimize the postal network. These attempts faced political and public resistance 
but resulted in an optimization project that was started in 2001. Under this project, 
roughly 1000 post offices were closed until 2005 (see Figure 2 below). In most 
cases a “doorstep service” (postal services upon request at the doorstep of each 
household provided by delivery personnel) was put in place instead of the post 
office. During that time Swiss Post also introduced the agency concept to its postal 
network. In an agency, postal services are provided through third party contractors like  grocery  stores or other  existing  retail  businesses.  Furthermore,  Swiss  Post 
started selling additional products like stationary goods, mobile phones or lottery 
tickets in selected outlets. At the same time PostFinance, Swiss Post‟s financial 
services  unit  developed from  a  payment  transactions  provider to a  provider  of 
financial services by adding savings accounts, funds and mortgages (the latter two 
backed by banks as PostFinance lacks a banking license). These products were 
also distributed through the post office network. Last but not least, Swiss Post 
steadily complemented its post office network with automated, electronic or hybrid 
services.  Examples include  ATM‟s, payment  orders,  online  banking,  electronic 
stamps, or online counters.   
Importantly, these restructurings provoked political resistance. At its peak in 
2004, a public vote targeting at preventing further restructurings was only rejected 
by a small majority of 50.1% of the Swiss population. In anticipation to this vote, 
the  parliament  had  already  amended  the  postal  act  with  an  “infrastructure 
obligation”  that  obliged  Swiss  Post  to  operate  a  physical  post  office  network 
throughout the country. That is, a new “input regulation” was put into place aiming  
at restricting Swiss Post in its possibilities of closing or substituting post offices or 
agencies  by  other  forms  of  access  points  such  as  doorstep  service  or 
electronic/hybrid  alternatives.  Currently,  the  regulatory  authority  translates  this 
obligation into the rule that 90% of the population have to be able to reach a post 
office within 20 minutes by foot or public transport. Where a doorstep service is 
available, the time range is extended to 30 minutes. 
 
Table 2: Swiss Post Network (as of 31.12.2007) 
Access points for retail customers  # 
Post offices and agencies  2469 
  of which post offices with payment services  2300 
  of which post offices without payment services  12 
  of which agencies with payment services  136 
  of which agencies without payment services  14 
  of which PostMobile stops  7 
Routes with doorstep services  1043 
 
Despite  these  political  developments,  Swiss  Post  decided  in  2003  that  the 
results of the aforementioned optimization project were not sufficient to adapt the 
post office network to the changing consumer needs. Therefore, a new project 
called “Ymago” was launched in order to further reduce the cost of the post office 
network while improving the costumer satisfaction at the same time. Several new 
concepts were tested in pilot studies and two of them, a new agency concept and a 
new  way  of  organizing  post  offices,  were implemented  starting  2007.  Table 2 
shows Swiss Post‟s network by the end of 2007. 
Politicians reluctant to those plans have already started new successful actions. 
In 2008, the Swiss parliament will vote whether physical financial transactions (i.e. 
in payments, out payments) shall be provided in agencies too. Such regulations 
would affect the profitability of agencies strongly negative as one can not expect 
from grocery stores to invest in expensive security installations, counter concepts 
and anti-money laundering measures.  
The political opposition against post office restructuring appears astonishing in 
relation to its minor impact on customer satisfaction and channel efficiency against the effects on overall mail volumes. We discuss those issues in the following two 
Chapters. 
 
3.2  Impact on Customer Satisfaction and Channel Costs 
Swiss Post measures its customer satisfaction through a standardized process 
every year. Interestingly, the two major reorganization projects seem not to have a 
negative effect on customer satisfaction. Total customer satisfaction being at 87 
points (out of 100) for private customers in the year 2000 (before the first project), 
the  value  dropped  slightly  to  85  points  in  2001.  Subsequently,  the  customer 
satisfaction oscillated between 86 and 85 points until 2004. After that it increased 
to 88 in 2005 and 89 in 2006. Despite the political resistance, Swiss Post obviously 
managed to maintain or even increase its customer satisfaction during these times 
of changes.  
On  the  financial  side,  Swiss  Post  was  able  reduce  its  channel  costs 
significantly to save CHF 100 million annually with the first restructuring project 
and  with  the  Ymago  project,  additional  savings  of  another  CHF  50  million 
annually are projected after its full implementation at the end of 2008. So far the 
data shows that the conversion of a post office into a partner agency reduces the 
operating costs clearly. For more details see the econometrical analysis of Koller 
and Trinkner (2008). These restructuring initiatives of the post office network are 
one of several factors boosting Swiss Posts profit to CHF 837 Mio in 2006 up from 
CHF 118 Mio in 2000. 
 
3.3  Impact on Overall Mail Volumes 
The size of the network is going to influence demand for postal products. In 
the following, we empirically discuss the impact of postal network restructuring on 
mail volumes using time-series techniques with quarterly Swiss data between 1980 
and 2006. Thereby, we operate with an updated data set as used by Trinkner and 
Grossmann (2006) and newly introduce a series of postal counters. Table 3 gives 
an overview of the data set used in our empirical assessment. For a more detailed 
description of the various variables see Trinkner and Grossmann (2006). 
Although mail volumes in Switzerland have increased in the observed period, 
they started to decline starting from 2001 (see Figure 2). Apart from GDP and 
prices, electronic alternatives and restructurings of the postal network may have 
influenced on mail volumes. It is difficult to ascribe volume changes to one of the 
two latter potential sources of impacts, however, as they emerged around the same 
time.   
On the one hand, beginning with the break-through of the internet, the use of 
e-mail and online platforms increased steadily. Whereas the use of the  Internet 
(eUse) exhibits an S-shaped penetration curve, e-banking platforms like the one 
from  PostFinance  (eBank)  grow  almost  linearly.  Similarly,  digital  networks  as 
mobile telephony or broadband (eBand) datastreaming emerged. Both are likely to 
affect mail volumes negatively as they present potential substitutes for physical 
mail.  On the other hand, the number of post offices started decreasing already in 
the 1980, albeit at a low rate. Only in the late 1990s, a more pronounced decline 
started. In 2001, Swiss Post started converting full post offices into agencies. Due 
to fewer access points and negative effects on customer loyalty, such closures 
could  affect  volumes  negatively.  Time  series  econometric  techniques  offer  a powerful tool to separate these two effects. More specifically, they allow us to 
determine whether mail volumes are shrinking due to “e-substitution”, i.e. market 
share  losses  of  letters  to  emerging  digital  substitutes,  or  due  to  post  offices 
closures, or both.   
 
 
Table 3: The Data 
Time Series 





Sample Period  Order of 
Integration 
         
Mail Volumes and GDP         
Total Mail Volume (q) 
Nominal GDP 













         
Prices         
Mail Real Price Index (p)  
Substitutes Real Price Index (s) 













         
Infrastructure         
No.of self-operated Post Offices (s_office) 
No. of Postal Agencies (agency) 












         
Substitution Proxies         
Online accounts with PostFinance (eBank)  Swiss Post    1998Q3-2006Q4  I(1) 
% active internet users (eUse) 
% broadband internet access (eBand) 
BFS 
BFS 
  1994Q1-2006Q4 
2001Q1-2006Q4 
 
         
Other         
dAB 
dq2, dq3, dq4 
Reflects the Introduction of A- (priority) and B- (economy) class Mail in 1991 
Seasonal Dummies 
The data on online accounts with PostFinance is available on a monthly basis. Up to present, it exhibits a 
constant linear trend. Other substitution proxies are available on a yearly basis. For data quality reasons, we 
therefore only use the number of online accounts in our estimations. 
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 We first estimate the impact of the postal network and e-substitution on mail 
volumes by means of a static regression of the form 
 
). ( ) ( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ( ) ln( 5 4 3 2 1 0 office eproxy s p gdp t trend q               
 
In order to eliminate seasonal effects and possible volume effects of changes 
in the product structure, we include appropriate dummy variables or adjust the data 
seasonally. For seasonal adjustments, in Model 1, we include dq2, dq3, dq4 and 
consider the introduction of A- and B-Post in 1991 with dAB. In Model 2, we also 
use dAB but seasonally adjust  GDP and q. The trend variable serves to avoid 
spurious regression (which is likely given the I(1) property of most variables). 
However,  one  can  assume  a  close  relationship  between  economic  activity, 
measured by GDP, and overall mail volumes.  
We tried several specifications and combinations of the various e-proxies. The 
results appear quite robust. We prefer eBank over the other e-proxies because of 
better data quality. Further, the series exhibits a more direct impact on overall mail 
volumes as customers of e-banking solutions usually are incentivized by banks to 
opt for electronic bank-statements. The results are also robust with regards to self-
operated post offices (s_office) or the sum of post offices and agencies (office). As 
the latter reflects the availability for postal service better, we include it in our 
preferred static regression (in real terms). The regression output is given in Table 
4. We prefer Model 1 as it exhibits better Durbin-Watson statistics.  
 
Table 4: Estimation results linear regression  

















































Standard Errors are White heteroskedasticity-consistent; t-Statistic in parenthesis. 
Included observations: 104 
** significant at 99% level 
*   significant at 95% level 
 
We hence confirm older estimates on the price-elasticity of mail demand with 
a value of -0.34/-0.33. The estimate for the GDP-elasticity of demand is lower than 
earlier estimates. This deviation is explained by our introduction of a trend and 
quarterly dummies which absorb much of the explanatory power of GDP (see VEC 
model below). Figure 3 displays the actual time series for volume, the fitted series 
and residuals.  
















We also use a long-run vector error correction (VEC) model to asses the long-
run equilibrium relationship between the non-stationary series of mail demand, 
GDP, prices, substitutes, and counter availability. The model allows us to discern 
between long-run equilibrium effects and short-run off-equilibrium adjustments. It 
assumes no constant nor trend in the cointegrating equation and the VAR. The 
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The  first  summand  contains  the  error  correction  term,  which  is  also  the 
cointegration relationship. The Johansen cointegration test indicates that there is 
one cointegrating relation.
5  
Table 5 reports the results obtained from Johansen‟s two-step procedure. The 
long-run equation (error correction term) is estimated first, second, the VAR is 
estimated, incorporating the cointegrating relation from the first step.  
In this empirical model, we find that mail volume is highly correlated with 
GDP. The estimated coefficient 1.19 is close to the one found by Trinkner and 
Grossmann (2006), which is 1.09. The price-elasticity of demand is -0.42, which is 
also in the range usually found in the empirical literature: From his survey of 
studies, Robinson (2007) concludes that price elasticity measures for mail products 
                                                       
4 It is similar to the one estimated by Trinkner and Grossmann (2006) and Harding (2004). 
5 According to econometric theory, a long-run equilibrium relationship may exist for 
nonstationary series if they are cointegrated, i.e., that a stationary linear combination of the 
variables is I(0). Under such conditions, a so-called (vector) error correction model (VEC) 
gives efficient estimates. typically range between -0.2 and -0.8.
6 The cross-elasticity with respect to 
substitute prices is not significantly different from zero. Note that – as in the static 
model – the distinction between priority and economy mail in 1991 had a (non-
significant) positive impact on overall mail volumes. 
 
 
Table 5: Estimation results VEC  
Long-run equilibrium equation 






























  t-1  t-2  t-3  t-4 
log(q)  -0.87 [-8.53]  -0.68 [-5.58]  -0.48 [-4.15]  -0.30 [-3.08] 
log(gdp)  0.21 [0.87]  0.36 [1.58]  0.18 [0.74]  -0.33 [-1.46] 
log(p)  -0.11 [-2.52]  -0.09 [-2.16]  -0.06 [-1.33]  -0.10 [-2.44] 
log(s)  0.16 [1.94]  -0.11 [-1.37]  -0.09 [-1.12]  -0.16 [-2.07] 
t-Statistic in parenthesis 
Adjusted R
2: 0.53 
Johansen cointegration test (number of cointegrating relations) 
H0  Trace  Max. EV 
none  40.93  26.77 
at most 1 relation  14.17  10.54 
at most 2 relations  3.63  3.62 
All endogenous variables are Granger-causal and according to lag-exclusion Wald 
tests, all lags are significant. 
 
 
We therefore find with both approaches that the decline in the number of post 
offices had no significant influence on mail volumes. Rather, we have to reject the 
null-hypothesis  that  e-substitutes  had  no  effect  on  overall  mail  volumes:  The 
emergence  of  electronic  substitutes  structurally  changed  the  pattern  of  mail 
demand in a negative way. The result on post office closures does not come as a 
surprise:  Private  customers  only  reflect  a  small  fraction  of  total  mail  volumes 
(about 15%) and as a collection channel for private customers, letter boxes are a 
valuable and very accessible alternative to post offices. 
 
3.4  Impact on Parcel Volumes and Financial Services 
In the above section we have extensively discussed the impact of post office 
restructurings on overall mail volumes. The reason for our empirical exercise with 
respect to mail volume was to explore whether resizing the post office network 
will induce customers to change their mailing behavior such that it may backfire in 
competition. If there had been a large impact of post office closures on volumes, 
the existing network may well have been optimal in size and scope.  
Similar or even more pronounced effects may be expected with respect to 
parcel volumes and financial services, as these are counter-intensive services as 
well. Empirically addressing these issues is beyond the scope of this paper mainly 
                                                       
6  Cf. also Fève et al. (2006) for a recent study on mail price elasticities. for two reasons: First, The estimation is made possible by clean time-series, 
especially with respect to mail volumes, which are still in monopoly. In the parcels 
and financial services markets, however, such clean time-series are not available 
over a long enough period of time. Further, as volumes are affected by various 
other factors, such as competition (third-party networks, services, prices, etc.) 
which cannot be properly controlled for. Hence, an empirical assessment fails 
through data availability. 
Second, in order to answer the initial question, a similar empirical assessment 
for the parcel and financial services markets is not necessary. In both of these 
markets, the postal network holds its ground against competing networks which 
can serve as a benchmark in our analysis. Recent analyses, e.g. by Cohen et al. 
(2008) show that compared to other networks, posts often have a disproportionate 
percentage of their post offices located in rural areas as compared with banks or 
pharmacies. In 2007, Swiss Post operated 2‟469 post offices offering financial 
services. Compared to private banking networks in Switzerland, this is obviously 
an excessive number: The largest private banking network (operated by the 
Raiffeisen Group) consists of 1‟162 offices (there are plans to reduce those 800); 
the second largest (operated by cantonal banks) consists of 727 offices. Hence, 
considering this competitive benchmark, a reduction in self-operated post offices is 
not expected to greatly affect demand in the market for financial services. 
A similar argument applies to the parcels market: In Switzerland, presence in 
self-operated outlets does not seem to be necessary at all to attract customers: 
Private competitors do not operate retail offices themselves: They are present in 
selected train stations, gas stations or stationary shops. However, all suppliers 
operate altogether about 100 outlets only, indicating that the present network of 
Swiss Post is hardly too small. This is in contrast to Germany, where Hermes now 
operates about 13‟000 agencies for its parcels business.  
 
 
4.  Key Strategic Issues 
 
In this Section, we identify key strategic issues of post office realignments. 
The review of the literature suggests the need of such restructurings in light of 
increasing competitive pressure as most historical post office networks seem to 
exhibit a disproportionate percentage of their post offices located in rural areas 
which rather reflects the distribution of public services than competitive goods. 
However, minimal coverage regulations usually hamper the possibilities of 
commercial realignments. Hence, regulatory restrictions and (potential) political 
responses to optimization projects significantly determine the available options. 
We therefore treat such minimal coverage restrictions as given and explore the 
basic options available for postal incumbents in light of the various country studies 
as described above (New Zealand, Sweden, France, Italy, Germany, UK, and 
Switzerland). Note that minimal coverage restrictions also preclude hybrid 
electronic means to deliver selected services. We hence concentrate on a feasible 
set of post office strategies, given a realistic set (at least for Switzerland) of input- 
oriented regulation. 
A comprehensive restructuring requires postal operators to value various 
issues that are interrelated. On the services side, restrictions on product offerings, cross-selling potential, credibility, and other revenues effects are important. On the 
cost side, channel selection, potential partners, IT and other infrastructure in place, 
economies of scale and scope, outsourcing possibilities, estimated savings, existing 
contractual arrangements, and possible external financing mechanisms play an 
important role. We do not explore these factors in detail. Rather we derive three 
postal network models that are sustainable in a fully competitive scenario.  
The first model, the “postal network” focuses on the efficient provision of the 
postal core business and requires a complete shut down of the traditional post 
office network. Instead, retail customers are offered a basic range of services in 
agencies run by partners countrywide. Thereby, the necessary economies of scope 
are exploited between postal services and a standalone partner core business such 
as the retailing of groceries. At the same time, regulatory accessibility restrictions 
are met. In contrast, business customers are served in tailored business centers that 
exhibit the necessary economies of scale and fulfill the specific needs of large 
customers. If no agencies are available, the model can be complemented with 
doorstep services. The main example of this model is Sweden‟s Posten AB. The 
model requires a broad absence of input regulations that aim at preserving 
traditional post offices.  
The second model, the “universal network” basically consists of classical, 
countrywide post offices that are extended with payments and financial services. 
This requires a respective IT infrastructure in place. Additionally, the network can 
be opened for other complex, but standardized services as insurance polices or 
community services. Thereby, remote “universal post offices” will likely develop 
into regional centers for “high value retailing” and services that require personal 
identification. To meet the needs of large postal customers, the model should be 
complemented with selected specialized business counters and collection services. 
Examples include La Poste from France or Australian Post. Royal Mail in the UK 
seems to develop into this direction too. However, the model goes along with costs 
of the Universal Service Obligation (USO): In remote areas, closures of such 
universal post offices will most probably bring net benefits. The reason is that for 
signing a mortgage once in their lifetime people are ready to drive into the next 
town – the network will be too dense in a commercial sense. That is, the respective 
cost of the USO is positive and calls for external financing (we assume a fully 
competitive scenario and hence no financing through a residual monopoly on light 
letters). The model applies for countries with high input regulations in terms of 
number of non-franchised post offices and respective possibilities to diversify into 
“high value retailing”.  
In the third model, the “postal bank network”, selected post offices are 
converted into banks that also perform postal services. To meet the regulatory 
coverage constraints, the network is complemented by agencies that are run by 
independent partners as well as doorstep services. Hence, economies of scope are 
exploited either with the own bank or with partners such as grocery stores. Again, 
the network is to be complemented with selected large customers‟ solutions. The 
model exists in real world in the mostly deregulated postal market of New 
Zealand. However, it requires the postal operators the regulatory possibility and 
commercial capability to run a bank.   
Table 6 provides an overview of the three basic strategic models.  Table 6: Three stylized sustainable models of post office networks 
  Postal Network  Universal Network  
 
Postal Bank Network 
Leading example  Sweden  France  New Zealand 
Required 
authorizations 
  Supply of Financial 




Postal Services only  Postal Services 











Full range offices 
Postal business counters 
Full range offices 
Postal business counters 
Agencies 
Doorstep Services 
Franchising  Only Agencies  No  Mixed 
External 
Financing 
No  Yes  No 
Ideal for 
incumbents … 
… that are not allowed to 
provide financial services 
… that can count on 
external financing and are 
limited in outsourcing 
possibilities 
… that have a banking 
license  
  
Which model postal services can opt for is  hence essentially determined by 
regulatory restrictions. For the case of Switzerland, Swiss Post is currently moving 
towards Model 3 and intends to provide a full coverage “postal bank network” free 
from the need of government subsidies but still securing the nationwide provision 
of  postal  services.  However,  the  issue  will  be  discussed  in  parliament  very 
controversially, as banks fear the postal banking license, right wing parties fear 
subsidies, and left wing parties and unions fear the conversion of post offices into 
agencies for its impact on employment conditions. 
 
 
5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Post offices constitute an important part of the Universal Service and its cost. 
Whereas post offices might play a vital role for communities, local labor markets, 
and social cohesion, the operators providing them increasingly face competition - 
be it through electronic substitutes or opening postal markets. Therefore postal 
incumbents strive to align their networks to competitive pressure and changing 
consumer needs.  
This paper aimed to contribute to a better understanding of post office network 
optimization and to identify its key strategic issues based on sound economics.  
We  first  examined  recent  realignments  of  postal  incumbent  networks  in 
various countries in the face of upcoming or increasing competition. It turns out 
that  none  of  the  incumbents  has  left  its  network  unchanged.  In  light  of  the 
realignments, the exploitation of economies of scope of postal products with other 
retail products seems to be at the heart of every restructuring. In other words, 
operating counters with postal services alone seems not to be a viable option. We 
observe  two  kinds  of  complementary  products:  (a)  counter-based  financial 
transactions/services needing support and security; (b) shop-based consumer goods 
as in grocery stores. For the latter category, counters seem inappropriate. Hence, 
incumbents  have  either  started  to  supplement  their  post  offices  with  mainly 
financial products or substituted their post offices by agencies run by third parties such as grocery stores. In the latter case, some operators have complemented those 
agencies with mobile postal services such as collection services by the mailman.   
Secondly,  to  understand  the  impact  of  such  restructurings  on  volumes  and 
profitability we assessed recent realignments of Swiss Post in more detail. By use 
of time-series techniques we found that the considerable decline in the number of 
post offices in Switzerland had no significant influence on mail volumes. Rather, 
the  recent  decline  of  overall  mail  volumes  is  due  to  the  rise  of  electronic 
substitutes. At the same time, Swiss Post‟s profitability increased steadily, (partly) 
due to channel costs savings in collection related to the post office restructuring, 
and  consumer  satisfaction  remained  high.  It  is  important  to  note  that  those 
restructurings, despite their success, faced heavy political resistance and resulted in 
new regulations: Swiss Post‟s universal service obligation was extended with a 
new requirement to run an area-wide physical post office network and respective 
detailed  input  regulations  which  hampered  further  optimization.  Hence,  Swiss 
Post‟s network currently in place represents only a politically constrained second 
best solution.  
Thirdly,  against  this  background  we  identifed  key  strategic  issues.  Given 
regulatory constraints being present in the investigated countries, we derive three 
basic  network  strategies for fully  liberalized  postal markets.  Depending  on the 
respective national regulations, incumbents will opt either for (1) a pure postal 
collection network that requires a radical realignment and in effect a complete shut 
down of the traditional (counter) network, or (2) for a “universal postal network” 
where traditional post offices are complemented with high value retailing such as 
financial services, or (3) a postal bank network where a large part of post offices 
will be converted into third-party agencies and the remaining one developed into 
postal banks offering the basic postal services as well. For the case of Switzerland, 
the necessary political decisions are not taken jet and it is unclear whether Swiss 
Post will end up in model (2) or (3).  
We  conclude  that  diversifying  into  financial  services  helps  to  sustain  a 
comparably larger and “classic” post office network based on the counter concept. 
If  no  such  option  is  available,  the  substitution  of  traditional  post  offices  by 
agencies  run  by  third  parties  seems  to  be  the  only  long-term  solution  under 
competition. In either case, economies of scope play a vital role for sustaining self-
financed access points for postal services. Hence, national regulations regarding a) 
the possibility of postal operators to offer financial services and b) the accessibility 
of postal services and eventually counters play a key role for both the incumbent‟s 
feasible network strategies and the degree of freedom within the chosen one. If 
alternative  and  hybrid  forms  of  service  provisions  are  allowed  to  substitute 
physical access points, the network will more likely be fully aligned to competitive 
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